Free Agents, Fire Sales, and Fungoes: An Econometric Examination of Team Success in Major League Baseball by Maynard, Corey R.
University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of
Economics
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 8
1999
Free Agents, Fire Sales, and Fungoes: An
Econometric Examination of Team Success in
Major League Baseball
Corey R. Maynard
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economics Departments at Illinois Wesleyan University and Illinois State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics by the editors of the journal. For
more information, please contact sdaviska@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Maynard, Corey R. (1999) "Free Agents, Fire Sales, and Fungoes: An Econometric Examination of Team Success in Major
League Baseball," University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol3/iss1/8
1 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FREE AGENTS, FIRE SALES, AND FUNGOES 
An Econometric Examination of Team Success in Major League Baseball 
 
By Corey R Maynard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
http://GLJLWDOFRPPRQVLZXHGXXDXMH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Major League Baseball is an industry. It has been and will continue to be run as one. 
Much to the chagrin of those who plea for the game to be truer to its boyish essence, the Major 
Leagues are driven by businessmen who want their corporations to be successful. Major League 
Baseball teams are in business to produce wins. Other authors have explored the relationship 
between a team’s success and its revenue.1 It is logical and fair to say that teams that win more 
often than they lose will draw more fans, and thus make more money, than those who lose more 
often than they win. With that in mind, I have explored what good organizational strategies teams 
use to put themselves into the first group, and conversely, what poor strategies cause teams to fall 
into the latter.  
It seems almost too obvious a statement that teams with more productive players tend to 
win. In my study, I attempted to control for players’ ability and focus on some finer, more 
disputed aspects of the game. Specifically, I looked at starter turnover rates, player acquisition 
techniques, managerial expertise, and the efficiency wage hypothesis as applied to Major League 
Baseball. In addition to players’ talent, I controlled for other aspects of teams’ success such as 
average player age, average player experience, percentage of games played by the starters, and 
the effect of being a non-expansion team in an expansion year. 
Because I developed a model to study several different phenomena, it seemed only 
logical to break down my discussion into distinct categories, so each topic could be given 
individual attention. Therefore, I offer my four-part hypothesis of organizational strategies and 
team success in Major League Baseball: 
1) Major League Baseball teams will tend to win more often when the amount of 
change in their starting line-up and pitching staff is minimized from one year to 
the next; 
                                                          
1 Zimbalist, 1992. 
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2) Teams that sign a higher percentage of their players from the free-agency market 
are not necessarily more productive; 
3) Managerial expertise has a positive and significant effect on a team’s success; 
4) The individual impact of team payroll on winning percentage, and thus the      
efficiency wage hypothesis, is often overstated in the case of Major League 
Baseball, and is not significant. 
 
Baseball is an attractive subject to study for a couple of reasons. First, both the outputs 
and the inputs are definable and quantifiable. An extraordinary abundance of data has been 
collected on the subject. Inputs (such as team payroll) are much more attainable in baseball than 
in virtually any other industry.  
 Secondly, the baseball model can be applied to other issues in labor economics. For 
example, in my model, a compensation variable tested whether people produce more by being 
paid a higher salary – independent of other effects. This subject, the efficiency wage hypothesis, 
is a current topic of discussion in labor economics. The age and experience variables could be 
very telling for a hiring firm – which is more important, the energy of youth or the knowledge 
and experience of older workers?  The hiring practice variables could help firms decide between 
training their own workers or hiring workers that have been trained by other companies to do 
similar things. The cohesiveness variables could also offer useful economic information, such as 
the effect on productivity of people working with the same group over a period of time and the 
value of hiring workers to long-term contracts (to encourage unit cohesiveness). The managerial 
expertise variables attempted to measure the direct effect of a manager’s ability on the production 
of the company.  
 Although the baseball industry is parallel in many ways to the rest of the business world, 
it also has some fairly major differences. These include the monopsonistic nature of the labor 
market and the fact that teams may not all be driven by exactly the same motives (some have 
stronger financial constraints and concerns, for instance). However, I believe that the results 
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obtained from my study are relevant to the larger business community despite some peculiarities 
of this industry.  
In the next section, the Methodology, I will outline my analytical technique and further 
explore the variables of my model. I will also introduce and explain my four “Effects,” to isolate 
the different issues of my hypotheses within my econometric model. In the Results section, I will 
outline how I made model specification changes during the regression-running process. I will 
then report the results of the regressions and interpret those results. In my Conclusion, I will 
reflect on my original hypotheses in light of the findings of my study and close with a short 
discussion of areas for possible future research.    
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In developing my theoretical model, I did extensive research of studies that attempted to 
answer similar questions. Although no study has looked at the effects of as many different aspects 
of team success as I did here, some tested somewhat similar models. Many authors looked at 
small components of my model, and the results of their research contributed to the development 
of this study.2    
My first hypothesis, the inverse relationship of player turnover and team winning 
percentage, was included because I believe that continuity and familiarity translates into success 
in baseball. The more comfortable players are with their teammates, coaches, city, etc., the more 
relaxed the players will be, and ready to perform at optimum levels.  
The second hypothesis, an insignificant relationship between percentage of starters 
obtained through free agency and winning percentage, was included to dispel a commonly held 
belief. I believe that development of talent through the minor leagues has been vastly under-
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appreciated, and that the success of teams that rely on the free agency market has been 
exaggerated. Minor league baseball is a training program for aspiring major leaguers. In the 
minors, players are taught the baseball-specific philosophy of their organization, become 
acquainted with many of their future big-league teammates, and become acclimated to the world 
of professional athletics. Teams set up their affiliation hierarchies to gradually let the players 
become accustomed to the team-specific Major League environments.3  Without this 
socialization, I believe that teams would have a difficult time realizing the full production 
potential of their players. 
The third hypothesis, that managers who have won in the past will win in the future, is 
fairly straightforward. I believe that managers possess specific human-capital and that the 
addition of a good manager will help a team, and conversely, that a poor manager will hinder the 
team’s performance.  
The final hypothesis, the lack of significance in the relationship between team payroll and 
winning percentage, is a response to the efficiency wage hypothesis. This theory will be explored 
later in this section. In brief, it assumes a positive relationship between salary and performance. I 
contend that in competitive sports the desire to produce for the sake of the team winning is more 
important than the desire to produce because the player has a large contract. Contrarily, it may be 
the case that players shirk their competitive desire, and thus their performance suffers, as they 
begin to think of themselves as a commodity rather than a baseball player (an observation not 
limited to, but certainly more present in, higher-paid athletes).   
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 A comprehensive literature review is not included here because of spacial constraints although it was a 
section of the original thesis.  For more information about obtaining the original paper, contact the Lewis & 
Clark College economics departmant.    
3 This can include cultural (the Boston Red Sox’s AAA team is located in New England – Pawtucket, RI; 
the Seattle Mariners’ is in northwest Washington, Tacoma, minutes away from Seattle), altitude-specific 
(the “mile-high” Colorado Rockies have their AAA ball club in the Rocky Mountains -- Colorado Springs), 
and climatic concerns (the Los Angeles Dodgers’ AAA team is in sunny Albuquerque, NM; the Houston 
Astros’ is in sizzling Tucson, AZ).  
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The Analytical Technique 
I tested my four-part hypothesis through econometric modeling and regression analysis, 
using the OLS framework. I specified a production function, with the dependant variable being 
team winning percentage4 in a single year and the independent variables being those directly 
related to my hypothesis as well as several controls. I chose a production function because I 
believed the primary responsibility of baseball teams is to produce victories, and a team may 
include more or less of certain inputs to increase their organization’s relative output (to win more 
games). This specification was supported by my literature research. 
 However, my model did not fall into the Cobb-Douglas mold5 (not all of the exogenous 
variables are logarithmically related to a logarithmic endogenous variable), and it therefore lacks 
some of the valuable interpretive characteristics of that specification. I hoped that my model 
would successfully isolate the phenomena discussed in my hypothesis. Success was judged by 
how well the model fit the data (through the adjusted R2 statistic) and the overall explanatory 
power of the model (with the F-statistic), with attention to variable-specific significance (through 
t-statistics), and an eye toward multicollinearity issues (through pair-wise correlation matrices 
and auxiliary regressions). Other violations of the OLS assumptions were then evaluated and 
dealt with as they arose. 
The observations in my model were every Major League Baseball team from 1989 
through 1996 (216 in all).6  I looked at both cross-sectional and time-series data, but each team’s 
winning percentage and make-up were treated as individual, unrelated observations. To test for 
                                                          
4 Team winning percentages from Total Baseball and The Baseball Encyclopedia. 
5 The Cobb-Douglas model was specified as Q=AKαLβ (or lnQ=αlnK + βlnL). 
6 Originally I intended my data set to include all teams from 1985 through 1996, but I learned that owners 
had been found guilty of collusion (not signing free agents) from 1985 through 1988.  This seemed to be an 
unnatural force on the free movement of players from team to team, and for fear that it would skew the 
acquisition data I decided to exclude observations from 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988.  For studies on 
collusion in Major League Baseball, see Bruggink and Rose (1990) and Durland and Sommers (1991). 
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any underlying organization-specific factors of team success, I included dummy variables for 
every team (except the Toronto Blue Jays who were excluded to avoid perfect multicollinearity).  
One issue that arose was that the relationships of some of the controls to one another and 
the dependant variable were a little unclear (multicollinearity may have muddied the results). 
Thus, the exact specification of the model had to be slightly altered from its original form. To 
avoid fitting the model to the specific set of data (“data mining”), I divided the data sample 
randomly into two halves and ran regressions on one half. I then tried to find the best fitting 
specification on the basis of the aforementioned tests and apply the altered model to the other, 
untainted half.7  
The remainder of the methodology section explores the independent variables I used in 
my model. For clarity, they are separated according to which of the four parts of my hypothesis 
they attempted to capture. I also include a fifth section to discuss the various controls I 
incorporated into my model.  
The Variables 
1) The Cohesion Effect  
The starter turnover variables (PS1, PS3, PS5) were defined as the percentage of starters 
that were starters on the same team 1, 3, and 5 years before.8 A “starter” was defined as the single 
player who played the most games at a given position in a given year for a given team. For this 
variable, the top 4 pitchers in the rotation (top 4 in “games started”) and the relief pitcher (team 
leader in “saves”) were included and given equal weight as each of the “position player” starters. 
In the American League (AL), the position player starters are the catcher, first baseman, second 
                                                          
7 This process was accomplished by using the Random Number Generator function in Microsoft Excel to 
assign a random number (between 0 and 1) to each observation, then using the Filter function to isolate the 
top 50%.   
8 While I would have preferred to study the entire roster of teams and have the player statistics weighted 
based on games played or at-bats, logistical problems prevented that.  With just the starters, approximately 
3000 players’ data was studied.   
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baseman, shortstop, third baseman, left fielder, center fielder, right fielder, and designated hitter. 
In the National League (NL), the starters are the same, with the exclusion of the designated hitter. 
Each starter for a team was given a value of 1 or 0 for this variable, 1 if they were a starter on the 
team in year t-1 and 0 if they were not (for PS1). The values for the team were then averaged, and 
this became the variable PS1.9 
The theory behind this variable is that it is important that the players are comfortable and 
familiar with their surroundings and their teammates for the team to be successful. I refer to this 
as the “Cohesion Effect.” It is not uncommon to hear baseball analysts talk of teams trying to 
“buy a pennant” by signing expensive free agents and trading away young prospects for players 
who can help them immediately. I argue that players do not perform as well, and thus their teams 
don’t produce wins as often, when they are unsettled and uncertain of their future, as is often the 
case with players who were not starters on the team in the previous year. Therefore, it might 
make more sense for teams not to trade away a starter for one with a little more ability (other 
things being equal), as the Cohesion Effect would negate a small improvement in talent. 
Therefore, the expected sign for this variable was positive. However, I suspected that the positive 
benefits of the cohesion effect tend to decline with time, and the significance of PS3 and PS5 to 
be less than that of PS1. 
2) The Acquisition Effect 
The acquisition variables (PFA, PML, PTR, and PMT) were defined as the percentage of 
starters (see Cohesion Effect) that were acquired through free agency, through minor league 
development, through trade, and through minor league trade.10 A player acquired in a minor 
                                                          
9 The yearly team data on games by position, games started, and saves were found in the 1997 Total 
Baseball encyclopedia.   
 
10 Acquisition information from various years of The Sporting News’ Baseball Almanac 
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league trade is a player who was predominantly a minor league player at the time of the trade, 
with little or no major league experience.11 
Obviously, not all four variables could be included at the same time in a regression 
because of the problem of perfect multicollinearity. Therefore, in one regression, I included three 
of the techniques (excluding PTR); in another I combined PML and PMT to a new variable, 
PMA, and once again excluded PTR; and in a third I included only PML and PFA. I also included 
squared values of the variables, as I suspect that the relationships may be quadratic.12   
This set of variables was introduced to this model to test what I believe is a common 
misconception: that teams must sign many high-priced free agents to compete in the Major 
Leagues today. I believe that teams are no less productive when they have a higher percentage of 
players developed in their own organization.13  I refer to this as the “Acquisition Effect.” 
Recently, many of the wealthier organizations have been condemned for buying pennants, and 
small-market franchises have cried for revenue sharing, saying they cannot compete without 
signing the big-name, big-salary free agents. However, impartial observation show that most big-
market teams developed their “core” of players in their own minor league system.14  This is at 
least partially true because each organization grooms their players to fit into their particular 
                                                          
11 This fourth category is included because the player will receive some of the positive benefits of having 
been in the team’s minor league system, but not as much as one who had been in the same system his entire 
career. 
12 I specify these relationships as quadratic, because I believe that the best acquisition technique is probably 
a combination of the possible inputs.  Therefore, for any single input, the productivity level (winning 
percentage) will increase to a certain point, beyond which it will decline.  
13 Although as expressed earlier, I do not believe this to be a purely linear relationship – at some point a 
mix of outside players is probably healthy to bring in foreign teachings and techniques.   
14 For a few examples: The Braves’ most important players in 1996 were arguably Chipper Jones, Javy 
Lopez, Tom Glavine, John Smoltz, Jeff Blauser, Mark Lemke, and Mark Wohlers, all “home-grown” 
players. The Marlins’ heroes in the 1997 World Series were Charles Johnson, Livan Hernandez, and Edgar 
Renteria – all developed in their young minor league system. The Yankees’ stars in 1996 were Bernie 
Williams, Derek Jeter, Andy Pettite, and Mariano Rivera – all Yankees from day one.   
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philosophy.15 Familiarity with the system and style of baseball that an organization practices 
logically makes its players and thus the team more successful. I argue that teams should invest 
more money in scouting and player development and less in free agents and high-priced veterans. 
I hoped for this variable to capture differences in teams based solely on their hiring practices. If 
the means of acquisition does, in fact, lead to a difference in performance, this variable should be 
positive and significant.    
3) The McCarthy Effect 
 The variables to measure managerial expertise (MGM, MGW, MGT) are the number of 
games the manager has managed in Major League Baseball, the manager’s career winning 
percentage, and the number of games the manager had been the manager of the given team.16 All 
of the statistics were recorded for the manager for his career prior to the given season. To deal 
with teams for whom mid-season managerial changes occurred, each manager’s statistics were 
weighted by percentage of the team’s games he managed.  
Another issue that arose was that career winning percentages became fairly meaningless 
when the manager managed few or no games (if a manager has never managed, it was not 
necessarily the case that he had no managerial talent). To deal with this effect, all managers who 
had less than 20 games managed were thrown into a pool – their success with their new team (that 
season) was recorded and averaged with the rest of the “rookie managers.”  From that data, a 
winning percentage was found and assigned to all rookie managers.17  While individuals 
obviously vary immensely in their managerial ability, I believed this to be a fairly accurate way 
of predicting the success of an inexperienced manager in Major League Baseball.  
                                                          
15 The St. Louis Cardinals, for instance, are more likely to develop players to fit into an aggressive, pressure 
oriented game, while the Seattle Mariners are probably more likely to develop players to fit into a line-up 
that tends to play for the three-run home run.   
16 Managerial data from The Baseball Encyclopedia. 
17 Incidentally, the winning percentage turned out to be .483, not too surprising considering that most above 
average teams would be reluctant to take a chance and hire an inexperienced rookie manager. 
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The theory behind this variable is that, holding everything else constant, the experience 
and talent of the manager affects the success of the team. I refer to this as the “McCarthy 
Effect.”18  While this seems to be a fairly logical conclusion, it is not undisputed. Scully (1974) 
basically dismissed the impact of the manager and coaches because the high R2 statistics he found 
without its inclusion. I believe that since he looked at the player performance for the year in 
question and not the talent the players had displayed before being coached by their specific 
manager, some of the effect of the above-average managers was captured in his player talent 
statistics (overstating the contribution of the players). Scully’s article is an academic 
representative of the prevailing school of thought that underappreciates good managers and 
overrates mediocre players.  
 My model includes the games managed with the given team in addition to games 
managed in the major leagues. The reasoning for this is that as a coach comes to know his players 
and their specific abilities better, he is more likely to make more successful decisions. However, I 
feared a high degree of multicollinearity between the two, and that one may need to be excluded 
from the final model.  
 I expected the McCarthy Effect and the corresponding variables to be positively 
correlated with the teams’ winning percentages. The MGW variable was specified as linear, but 
MGT and MGM was logarithmic, as I believed them to be relationships with diminishing 
returns.19   
4) The Steinbrenner Effect 
 The fourth part of my hypothesis is the effect of team payroll on success, other things 
held constant. This concept was captured in the variable LNPSAL, defined as the natural log of 
                                                          
18 I have named this theory after Joe McCarthy, the manager with the highest career winning percentage in  
the modern era (.615).   
19 A manager with 10,000 games managed will probably not be twice as successful as one with 5,000.   
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the team payroll20 divided by the average team payroll for the given year.21 Team payroll was 
used instead of average starter salary for two reasons. To begin with, it was much easier to deal 
with 217 data points than almost 3000. More importantly, however, is that the focus of the study 
is team performance. While in some other variables starter data were used out of logistical 
necessity, it is more accurate to include the data for the entire team when available. 
 This variable was included to test another popularly accepted belief – that teams with 
bigger payrolls are more successful. That belief is referred to as the “Steinbrenner Effect.”22  In 
labor economics, this is part of the efficiency wage hypothesis. The theory is that people who are 
paid more than their worth are compelled to behave less selfishly than those paid less than their 
worth. As defined by Akerlof and Yellen (1986), “The efficiency wage hypothesis [states that] 
labor productivity depends on the real wage paid by the firm . . . [The theory identifies] four 
benefits of higher wage payments: reduced shirking of work by employees due to higher cost of 
job loss, lower turnover, improvement in the average quality of job applicants, and improved 
morale.”  
 I question the notion that a huge payroll means a successful ball club. I argue that, given 
the enormous and escalating nature of players’ salaries, a big contract for a player has little effect 
on either the job security or lifestyle of the player.23  The superstars have begun to see the 
enormous, multi-million dollar contracts as status symbols rather than a means of sustenance. 
Therefore, when a player such as Gary Sheffield receives a record contract, his period of 
                                                          
20 Team payroll data from USA Today, various issues. 
21 The payrolls are adjusted by year because of the tremendous increase in average team payroll in the time 
period being studied.  In 1989, the average Major League team had a payroll of just over $14,000,000.  By 
1996, that figure more than doubled, to almost $32,000,000. 
22 I have named this effect after George Steinbrenner, the extremely active owner of the New York Yankees 
who has become a symbol of the high-spending strategy of player compensation.  The Yankees perennially 
have the highest team payroll.   
  
23 Alternatively, some have argued that a big salary makes a player more likely to be terminated or traded, 
as teams are reluctant to sign or want high priced mediocre talent when comparable players can be found at 
much more affordable prices. 
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unselfishness is short-lived. As soon as another player (read: Albert Belle) receives a bigger 
contract, Sheffield is motivated to post statistics that will put him in a position to sign another 
record contract. As has often been demonstrated, big individual seasons do not directly equate to 
championship seasons for teams.24  
 Even those who support the significance of this variable do not claim it to be linearly 
related to winning percentage. Therefore, it was specified as logarithmic. If my hypothesis held, 
however, it would have been insignificant. If the Steinbrenner Effect was a real phenomenon, 
LNPSAL would have been positive and significant.   
5) The Controls 
 The controls were the parts of regression that were mostly likely to be altered one way or 
another from the beginning model to the final product. I hoped to control for player talent, age, 
and experience, as well as the percentage of games played by the starters and expansion-related 
effects.  
 The player talent controls were by far the most complex and time-consuming of the 
variables. With that in mind, several alternative controls were offered, with the ones used 
determined through regression analysis. There were different kinds of controls for position 
players, for starting pitchers, and for relief pitchers. 
 For the position player controls I used a combination of Total Player Rating (TPR), 
batting average (AVG), slugging average (SLG), Production (PRO), and weighted fielding 
average (WFA).25 The most important aspect of these controls to note is that they were an attempt 
to measure the abilities of the players independent of the other factors. For that reason, statistical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
24 For example, Andre Dawson won the Most Valuable Player award in 1987 while leading the National 
League in home runs and RBIs.  His team, the Chicago Cubs, finished in last place.  In 1996, Pat Hentgen 
won the American League Cy Young Award, while winning 20 games with a 3.22 ERA.  His team, the 
Toronto Blue Jays, only managed to edge out the lowly Detroit Tigers to avoid last place in the AL East.  
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data for the year in question were not used, but rather career statistics prior to the season. This 
was a key difference from other authors and a reason to expect my R2 statistics to not be as high. 
 The weighting system for the fielding statistics was based on the percentage of attempts 
for each position as they occurred in a single year. 1995 was used because it was the only season 
for which I had complete team-by-team positional fielding statistics. There was no apparent 
reason why 1995 should not be representative of every season in terms of percentage of chances 
by position. One problem with fielding statistics, however, is that they are notoriously poor 
evaluators of fielding ability. The fielding average, from which the WFA was derived, is the 
number of accepted chances divided by the number of total chances. This statistic rewards players 
with “good hands,” rather than those with great mobility. Unfortunately, I was forced to use the 
WFA statistic for lack of a better alternative.  
The Total Player Rating (TPR) recorded was the sum of the teams’ players in year (t-1). 
Since TPR was a cumulative statistic, I did not use career totals because of multicollinearity 
problems with experience. The other offensive statistics (AVG, SLG, PRO) were team averages 
of the players’ career totals prior to the given year.  
 Similar to rookie managers, players with few or no at-bats in the Major Leagues would 
have skewed the data set, so they were thrown into a pool. For the cut-off for inclusion in this 
pool, I decided to use the same amount of at-bats that the Baseball Writers Association of 
America uses as the guidelines for consideration for the Rookie of the Year Award (130 at-bats). 
Instead of throwing all players into the same pool, however, I chose to distinguish between the 
average performance of different positions. One would not expect a rookie second baseman to 
produce the same kind of statistics as a rookie first baseman or center fielder. As with the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 For the statistical definitions of the terms, consult Appendix A, which can be found after the conclusion. 
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managers, though, rookies (by position) were assigned an average level at which they were 
expected to produce.  
 For the pitcher control statistics, I used the same ones for starting and relief pitching, 
although they were separated as different variables. The variables I used for pitchers was a 
combination of Total Pitcher Index (TPI), earned run average (ERA), strikeout to walk ratio 
(SOB), walks plus hits per nine innings (BBH), and strikeouts per nine innings (SO9). Since the 
AL pitchers were forced to face an extra hitter in the lineup (the DH), their statistics were 
typically worse than those in the NL. Considering the structural difference between the leagues 
and the fact that AL pitchers did not directly compete against NL pitchers (until 1997), it seemed 
fair to consider pitching talent for each league separately. Therefore, all pitching statistics, except 
TPI (which is already deflated), were related to the yearly league-specific average. 
 TPI was treated the same way as TPR was for the hitters, and with the exception of the 
yearly averages, the rest of the pitching controls were treated the same way as the offensive hitter 
statistics. Rookie pitchers26 were dealt with slightly differently than their hitting counterparts, 
however. For the reason stated above, rookie pitchers were separated by league. Additionally, it is 
consistently argued that expansion causes a “thinning of the pitching talent,” meaning that 
pitchers that may otherwise be developing in the minor leagues or working in the bullpen are 
forced into starting roles. A simple comparison of rookie pitcher performance before and after 
expansion supported this argument.27  In light of this, I decided to distinguish between pre-
expansion and post-expansion rookies. 
 Two other important controls included in my model were intended to capture the effects 
of age and experience on team performance. This area has been studied fairly well, and previous 
                                                          
26 Rookie pitchers are defined by the BBWAA as those with less than 50 innings pitched. 
27 ERAs, for example:  NL pre-EXP = 3.86, post-EXP = 4.09; AL pre-EXP = 4.07, AL post-EXP = 5.14  
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authors agreed that talent peaks at about age 27.28 The experience factor (number of games played 
in Major League Baseball) was expected to be logarithmic, while the age factor (average player 
age at opening day, to the nearest half-year) was quadratic. The age and experience variables 
should account for the fact that younger players’ career statistics tend to understate their talent, 
and older players’ career statistics may speak of talent that has lessened.  
 Another important control was that of percentage of games played by the position players 
(HGA) and percentage of games started by the top 4 in the pitching rotation (PGA). This was key 
because it accounts for injuries that may keep a very talented team from having its best players on 
the field in any given game. The final control was for non-expansion teams in an expansion year 
(EXP). This was expected to be positive, as expansion teams are generally not at the same 
competitive level in their first year of play.  
As noted earlier, the variety of controls offered a large degree of flexibility in the 
specification of the model. The final set of variables was not determined until after regressions 
and tests were run. It was with this in mind that the data sample was halved to avoid data mining. 
 
THE RESULTS 
 
With my data set halved, I began running a series of regressions to find the best-fitting 
model (with judgement based on adjusted R2 statistics, t-statistics, and F-statistics). I ran the 
regressions in five stages. First, I included all of the independent variables in the model and tested 
each control (i.e. hitter performance statistics) until I found the best-fitting combination. After 
that, I experimented with the specification of a variable group I was unsure of. Next, I looked at 
the coefficients of the variables, taking special note of their signs, and compared them to what I 
expected. If variables had unexpected signs, I tried to determine if the reason for that outcome 
                                                          
28 See Krohn, 1983 and Schultz, Musa, and Staszewski, 1994.  
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was a real-world phenomenon or a function of the model specification. To address issues of 
multicollinearity, I ran auxiliary regressions (and compared their adjusted R2 results to that of the 
overall model) and interpreted the pair-wise correlation matrix. When problems arose, I re-
evaluated my model and made changes where necessary. Finally, I applied my model to the other 
half of the data sample and examined those results. 29 
The results on the untainted half were, as could be expected, not as strong as on the first 
half. However, the results of this regression were very telling about the nature of team 
organization and success in Major League Baseball. In addition to the ordinary least squares 
estimation, I ran auxiliary R2 regressions and a pair-wise correlation matrix. The results of this 
final regression and the auxiliary regressions are shown in figure 1.0. 
Figure 1.0       
       
OVERALL 
MODEL: 
      
Adjusted R2 F-Statistic P-Value n    
0.4547 5.958 0.000 108    
       
BY VARIABLE:       
Variable Group F-Test (p-
value) 
Variable Coefficien
t 
t-statistic P-value Aux R2 
       
Cohesion Effect 1.993 (0.142)      
  PS1 0.0551 1.537 0.128 0.372 
  PS5 -0.0841 -1.357 0.178 0.443 
Acquisition Effect 0.657 (0.684)      
  PFA 0.0073 0.061 0.952 0.907 
  PML 0.0335 0.236 0.814 0.944 
  PMT -0.1300 -0.794 0.429 0.903 
  PFA2 0.0244 0.103 0.918 0.906 
  PML2 -0.1143 -0.635 0.527 0.943 
  PMT2 0.4853 0.873 0.385 0.898 
McCarthy Effect 0.044 (0.834)      
  MGW 0.0270 0.210 0.834 0.327 
Steinbrenner 
Effect 
1.646 (0.203)      
                                                          
29 Again, a much more thorough discussion of the manipulation of the model was included in the original 
thesis.   
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  lnPSAL 0.0278 1.283 0.203 0.588 
Controls       
  TPI 0.0030 2.143 0.035 0.357 
  RSO9 0.0007 0.202 0.841 0.224 
  TPR 0.0036 3.363 0.001 0.272 
  WFA -0.0275 -0.296 0.768 0.075 
  EXP -0.0192 -0.974 0.332 0.092 
  GML -0.0000 -1.247 0.216 0.659 
  HGA 0.2617 2.487 0.015 0.204 
  PGA 0.8896 3.332 0.001 0.248 
 
 
 Obviously, some variables acted more like I had expected than others. The player salary 
and player turnover statistics (LNPSAL, PS1 and PS5) behaved very much like I had anticipated. 
The experience variable, GML, reflected the same pattern that was shown on regressions of the 
first half of the data sample. HGA, PGA, TPR and TPI also reflected earlier trends. The other 
variables, however, were not quite as close to the expected results.  
 The acquisition variables (PFA, PML, PMT), all became extremely insignificant. The 
MGW variable was the sign I had originally anticipated, but was no longer of any real 
significance. For an unexplainable reason, the relief pitchers’ talent statistic, RSO9, also became 
extremely insignificant. Finally, the EXP and WFA variables also presented questionable results.  
 The overall explanatory power of the model was less than the preliminary regressions, 
but the F-statistic was strong enough to reject the null that the model was equal to zero beyond 
the 99.9% level. Serious issues of multicollinearity seemed to have been dealt with for the most 
part, as the auxiliary regressions and pair-wise correlation matrix showed no extremely 
significant relationships.  
 To look at what the results of the regression say about my hypotheses, I will address each 
variable group and their corresponding effects.  
The Cohesion Effect 
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 In my model, the Cohesion Effect, or the phenomena that Major League teams win more 
often with less change in their starting players from one year to the next, was captured by the 
variables PS1 and PS5. PS1 and PS5 were defined as the percentage of starters (position players 
and pitchers) who were starters on the same team in the previous year and five years prior to the 
current year (respectively). The hypothesized sign was positive, because of the Cohesion Effect. 
The results of the regression showed that PS1 was indeed positive, and fairly significant (at an 
88% level). The PS5 statistic yielded interesting results, however, as its coefficient was negative 
and significant. This could be indicate that not enough turnover for a team over a five year period 
means no influx of new, younger talent – and the team is not as successful.  
According to the results, all else constant, a one-percent increase in the number of starters 
kept in the line-up or rotation from one year to the next will lead to a .0005 increase in a team’s 
winning percentage. In terms more relevant to the subject matter, one additional player being 
retained in the starting line-up from one year to the next will, on average, lead to a increase of 
.004 on the teams’ rate of success. While this effect may seem relatively minor, maintaining an 
entire line-up and pitching rotation as opposed to completely changing them makes an average of 
a .056 change in the team’s performance (nine games). That amount is large enough to alter the 
outcome of most of the pennant races in the evaluated time period. The Cohesion Effect, at least 
in the short-term, appeared to be a very real phenomenon.  
The Acquisition Effect 
 The Acquisition Effect was an examination of the recent trend to hire players through the 
free agency market, as opposed to developing them through a team’s own minor league system. 
This effect was represented in my model by the variables PFA, PML, PMT, PMT2, PML2, and 
PFA2. PFA, PML, and PMT are defined as the percentage of starters that were acquired through 
the free agency market, minor league system, and minor league trade, respectively. PMT2, 
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PML2, and PFA2 are the squares of PMT, PML, and PFA, respectively. The squared terms were 
included in the model, with support from the first data sample, to illustrate the quadratic nature of 
this relationship. 
 However, as the analysis of the second data set illustrated and as Krautman (1994) found, 
there was extremely little relationship between the way the players were acquired and the teams’ 
winning percentages. This runs contrary to the popular current belief in the Major Leagues that 
has made smaller market teams feel they cannot compete without the ability to sign expensive 
free agents.  
The McCarthy Effect 
 The McCarthy Effect is the hypothesis that the individual talents of managers affected the 
performance of their teams. In my model, it was represented by MGW, the managers’ winning 
percentages going into the season in question. I expected it would be positive, as I thought that 
the managers’ ability levels would have significant effect on teams’ performances. However, the 
results did not support this hypothesis. 
 While I did, in fact, see a positive relationship (unlike prior regressions), the results could 
not reject the null of the relationship being equal to zero with any level of certainty. This could 
have occurred for a couple of reasons. The first possibility is that managers do not, in fact, 
perform a very significant function in Major League Baseball. Since the players are called upon 
to perform, and the manager just puts the best players in the line-up as often as possible, the 
success of the team does not rely on the ability of the manager.  
The other possibility, and the one I am more inclined to believe, is that the talent of 
managers was not captured nor isolated enough in my model. The managers’ past winning 
percentages are a very simple measure of the managers’ abilities and dependent on the talent of 
the players they had coached before. Also, if the player talent control statistics are not excellent 
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measures of the true talents of the players (which I suspect), the managerial effect would not be 
very well isolated.  
The lack of isolation of the managers’ talents may have also been due to the fact that the 
talent statistics used were the player ratings from the previous year. Considering that most 
baseball players do not change teams from one year to the next, and most managers stay with a 
team for more than one year, the players’ previous year statistics were already affected by the 
ability of the manager. My variable would only look at how much better the manager made a 
player perform than he had made the same player in the previous year – not an entirely fair 
evaluation of coaching ability.  
For these reasons and with a lack of statistical evidence, I withhold judgement on the 
McCarthy Effect. More research may shed more light on the contribution of managers.  
The Steinbrenner Effect 
 The last of my four-part hypothesis was the Steinbrenner Effect, or as labor economists 
refer to it, the efficiency wage hypothesis. This states that, controlling for everything else, players 
that are paid more will be more productive. In my model, I attempted to capture this phenomenon 
with the variable LNPSAL, defined as the natural log of the teams’ payrolls relative to other 
teams in the same year. While defining the variable this way was necessary because of inflating 
salaries, it made the variable lose some of its interpretive ability.  
 LNPSAL was found to be positive and significant in my regressions (at the 80% level). 
This could have occurred for two reasons. The first explanation is that my model captured the 
effect I was hoping it would explain. This would mean that teams with more money would 
possess a competitive advantage, because to get more out of their players they would need only to 
pay them more. However, I suspect that a second explanation is more likely. Considering that the 
primary determinants of player salary (and thus team payroll) are experience and talent, I would 
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need to control for those two factors to fully isolate the Steinbrenner Effect. I fear that my 
controls did not account for as much as I had hoped, and thus some of the player talent was 
captured in the LNPSAL variable. This would make the variable seem more positive and 
significant than it may be in reality.  
Regardless of the explanation, the results did show a positive and fairly significant 
relationship here, and the inclusion of the variable seemed necessary. This supports small market 
claims that it is difficult for teams with smaller payrolls to compete with those without as much 
financial constraints. The Steinbrenner Effect appears to be a real phenomenon.  
 
Controls  
 The most important controls came out almost exactly as I had expected. HGA, PGA, 
TPR, and TPI were all extremely significant and positive (all were significant at the 97% level). 
The results of the other controls, while less significant, were somewhat surprising.  
 I had expected that as the average amount of experience increased for a team, the team 
would be more successful. However, the results of the regressions show that GML, the average 
number of games in the major leagues, was significant and negative. This means that all else 
being equal, a less experienced (and probably younger) team will be more successful. This could 
in part be due to the nature of the baseball season. The baseball season is extraordinarily long, 
and mostly takes place in the hottest times of the summer. It is not uncommon for the 
performance of talented players to fade as the season progresses for no other reason than physical 
and mental exhaustion. Younger, more vibrant players are probably better able to handle the 
grueling summer and to help their teams win more. So, if two teams of identical talent, make-up, 
payroll, etc are competing against each other, the less experienced (and more importantly 
younger) players will win more often. 
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 The variable used to capture relief pitchers’ contributions produced a much less 
explainable result. RSO9, the relief pitchers’ strikeouts per nine innings pitched, was expected to 
be positive, and it was. However, in the untainted data set the variable lost most of its 
significance. The only possible explanation that I can offer is that the variable did not capture 
what I had hoped. In future studies, a different variable to reflect the contribution of relief 
pitchers should be used.  
 The EXP variable, positive and significant in preliminary regressions, also changed signs 
and lost significance. This suggested that all else being equal, teams are less successful when they 
are a non-expansion team in an expansion year. The surprising outcome of this regression may in 
part be due to the strength of other independent variables. If the other exogenous factors 
accurately captured the reason why expansion teams are typically bad performers, than this 
variable would not be of very much significance.  
 The final control variable, weighted fielding average (WFA) was also insignificant and of 
the wrong sign. The weakness of fielding measures was addressed earlier, and the lack of solid 
results for this variable are probably a reflection of that.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The testing of my hypotheses produced mixed results, but the outcomes were for the most 
part as expected. The Cohesion Effect (that Major League Baseball teams will tend to win more 
often when the amount of change in their starting line-up and pitching staff is minimized from 
one year to the next) appeared to be a real phenomenon, as the PS1 variable was both positive and 
significant. The insignificance of the free agency variables helped support the Acquisition Effect 
(that teams that sign a higher percentage of their players from the free-agency market are not 
necessarily more productive). The McCarthy Effect (that managerial expertise has a positive and 
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significant effect on a team’s success) was not supported by the data, but that may have been due 
to the weakness of the managerial talent variable, MGW. The Steinbrenner Effect (that, other 
things equal, teams with bigger payrolls will be more successful) and thus the efficiency wage 
hypothesis was somewhat supported – contrary to my original hypothesis.  
 These results shed some light on issues that have been disputed by the popular press and 
baseball personnel recently. I believe this study has contributed two significant findings to the 
current baseball discussion. Firstly, teams should no longer complain about the necessity and 
unaffordability of signing free agents to compete in the big leagues. The results show that they 
are not vital to a team’s success. Secondly, teams should focus on keeping their line-up as intact 
from one year to the next as they can, as cohesion breeds victories.30    
Successful organizational strategies are more complex than simply buying talent. Teams 
like the Montreal Expos have shown that it is not impossible for small market clubs to compete 
with their more wealthy peers. I hope that the current owners and general managers of baseball 
will operate based on the realities of their industry and not on the flawed conventional wisdom 
that has victimized the industry of late. 
 Professional baseball offers a wealth of information on an amazingly diverse variety of 
subjects. I hope that shortcomings in my model are explored and developed further in future 
research. More explanatory controls would have been extremely helpful, and current statistical 
experimentation is starting to offer alternatives. Better measures of managerial talent and fielding 
ability would have made my model much stronger. It may be very interesting for a researcher to 
apply my model, or one similar to it, to the data for entire teams – not just the starters. The direct 
impact of specific general managers may even be an interesting study. The baseball industry has 
not suffered from a lack of scholarly interest. New statistical and analytical techniques make the 
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explanatory power of models much stronger and their specifications more complex. With each 
study, we learn a little bit more about the intricacies of our national pastime.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 Unfortunately, for teams to keep their line-up intact from year to year they are often forced to pay higher 
salaries to their players to deter them from entering the free agent market.  This is yet another explanation 
(from the wage efficiency theory) of why teams with higher payrolls may be more successful.   
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APPENDIX A  -- VARIABLE REFERENCE SHEET 
ABBH: Average League Adjusted career walks plus hits per 9 innings for starting pitchers 
AERA: Average League Adjusted career Earned Run Average for starting pitchers 
AGE: Average Age of all players 
ASO9: Average League Adjusted career strikeouts per 9 innings for starting pitchers 
ASOB: Average League Adjusted career strikeout to walk ratio for starting pitchers 
AVG: Average career Batting Average for non-pitchers 
EXP: Dummy for being a non-expansion team in an expansion year 
GML: Average games played in MLB for non-pitchers 
HGA: Average % of games in year (t) played by non-pitcher starters 
IPML: Average innings pitched in MLB by pitchers 
MGM: Number of games managed in MLB by manager 
MGT: Number of games managed with given team by manager 
MGW: Manager’s career winning percentage 
PFA: % of players acquired through free agency 
PGA: Average % of games in year (t) started by starting pitchers 
PMI: % of player acquired via the minor leagues or through minor league trade 
PML: % of players acquired through the minor leagues 
PMT: % of players acquired through minor league trade 
PRO: Average career Production for non-pitchers 
PS1: % of players that started on the same team 1 year before 
PS3: % of players that started on the same team 3 years before 
PS5: % of players that started on the same team 5 years before 
PSAL: Team payroll divided by yearly average team payroll  
PTR: % of players acquired through major league trade 
RBBH: Career walks plus hits per 9 innings for relief pitchers 
RERA: Career Earned Run Average for relief pitchers 
RSO9:  Career Strikeouts Per 9 innings for relief pitchers 
RSOB:  Career strikeout to walk ratio for relief pitchers 
SLG: Average career Slugging Average for non-pitchers 
TPI: Sum of Total Pitcher Indexes in year (t-1) for starting pitchers 
TPR: Sum of Total Player Ratings in year (t-1) for non-pitchers 
WFA: Career Weighted Fielding Average for non-pitchers 
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WIN: Team winning percentage in year t 
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